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IN THE SIJPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
STEVEN V. SINGLETON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19107 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information with Theft, a 
third degree felony, under ntah Code Ann., 7fi-fi-404 (Supp. 
l 97 R). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of Theft, a third degree felony on November 16, 1982, in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding. on 
December 14, 1982, Appellant was ordered committed to the Utah 
State Prison for the indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years and fined ssoo.no. Defendant was granted a stay of 
execution of the above sentence and placed on probation for a 
period of three years under the supervision of the Department 
of Adult Probation and Parole. 
RELIEF S0llGHT 0N /\Yl'F,Z\L 
Respondent seeks an order of this rnurt affirminq 
the verdict and judgment in this casP. 
STATEMENT 0F FA\TS 
On November 11, 19Rl, around 7:nn r.m., Denise 
Bailey was driving home (T. 2q). As she slowed down to turn 
into her driveway, she noticed a little reflection and some 
movement near a bush in the field next to her house (T. 3n, 
40). As she pulled into her driveway, a man stepped out from 
behind the bush and walked right in front of her car (T. 30). 
The man walked down the street and Ms. Bailey watched him 
through her rear view mirror (T. 1n). When she was sure he 
was not around, she went to the bush and discovered a stereo 
system (T. 41). She immediately called the police (T. 41). 
When Officer Maack arrived, he discovered that the 
home next to Ms. Bailey's had been burglarized (T. 90). The 
front door glass had been broken in order to gain entry into 
the home ( T. 9 n ) • Mr. Goldstein, the owner of the house, 
observed that a stereo was missing (T. 90). He had not given 
permission to anyone to enter his residence or to remove the 
stereo (T. 24). 
Following this discovery, officer Maack called in a 
description of the man seen by Ms. Railey to other officers in 
the vicinity (T. 93). The suspect was descrihed as wearing 
blue jeans, a light weight blue jacket, a white shirt, a two 
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tone baseball cap, hiking type shoes, with dark hair, of 
medium height and a slender build (T. 3q, 40). Within fifteen 
minutes, a suspect, exactly matching the description given by 
Ms. Bailey, was spotted just five and a half blocks away from 
Ms. Bailey's home (T. g3). 
The appellant, Steve Singleton was brought before 
Ms. Bailey for a show-up (T. 93). Appellant was standing next 
to the police car under a street light when Ms. Bailey 
identified appellant from her porch steps and then frori the 
street, a distance of approximately ten feet (T. 78, 97). 
Ms. Bailey identified the appellant as the man she 
had watched earlier in the evening walk from behind the bush, 
in front at her car and down the street (T. 44). 
Tt does not specify in the transcript exactly when 
appellant was placed under arrest, but following the 
identification, appellant was informed of his Miranda rights 
( T. g 7). When asked if he understood the rights and had 
anything to say, he said that he understood and didn't have 
anything to say ( T. gg). Then on the way to the police 
station he volunteered the following, "I guess she saw me with 
the stereo equipment too?" (T. 117). Neither Officer Maack 
nor the other officers had provoked the comment, nor had they 
previously mentioned a missing stereo (T. 100), and when asked 
how he knew about a stereo, the appellant became restless and 
upset (T. 118). 
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The appellant had fresh cuts nn his han<is at the 
time he was picked up (T. lnl). At trial, appellant presented 
evidence that he had cut his hands a week earlier when he had 
to break a window to get into his own home (T. 173). The 
state presented evidence that appellant harl given a different 
explanation to the two officers who first detained him (T. 
192, 193), and yet another explanation to Officer Maack (T. 
121) • Even though these explanations were given to the 
officers prior to the time appellant received the Miranda 
rights, counsel for the appellant did not object at the time 
such testimony was given at trial (T. 101, ln2, 192, 193); the 
explanations were received as evidence. A subsequent motion 
for mistrial on the matter was denied (T. 244, 245). 
Also during the trial proceedings counsel for the 
appellant objected to the prosecutor's questions directed to 
Officer Maack about the events at the time of identification 
and the reading of the Miranda rights (T. 'l9). The objection 
was overruled (T. 99). Counsel then moved for a mistrial on 
the grounds that the questioning was a comment on appellant's 
post arrest sentence (T. 1.03). That motion for a mistrial 
was denied (T. 159). Months later, on an appeal to the same 
court, counsel for the appellant made a motion for a new trial 




THF PROSECUTOR'S SOLICITATION OF TESTIMONY 
FROM A POLICE OFFICER AS TO THE EVENTS AT 
THE TIME THE APPELLANT RECEIVED THE 
MIRANDA RIGHTS WAS PROPER AS IT 
ESTABLISHED THE FOUNDATION FOR A LATER 
STATEMENT MADE BY APPELLANT. 
Appellant contends that the prosecutor's 
solicitation of testimony from Officer Maack as to the 
rirrLJmstanrPs at the time of his identification and subsequent 
receipt of the Miranda rights violated his Fifth Amendment 
privilege and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights as an 
improper comment on his post-arrest silence. 
The testimony solicited by the prosecutor now in 
question, is as follows: ( T. 9 7- 1 0 0) • 
o. After she made her identification of the 
individual, what did you do? 
A. I placed the individual back in my car and read 
him his rights. 
o. What rights did you read? 
A. Miranda. 
o. Did you read that from a card, or personally, or 
what? 
A. From a card. 
o. Did he indicate that he understood his rights? 
l\. Yes, sir, he did. 
o. For the record, do you have the card with you? 
-s-
A. No, sir, I don't. 
o. Can you remember what the card said, what the 
rights are that you gave? 
A. always read it directly from a card. 
o. Is that a standard practice procedure card? 
A. Yes, it is. 
O. After reading that, did you ask him if he 
understood his rights? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
o. Did he respond? 
A. Yes, sir. 
o. What did he say? 
A. I can describe the car a little bit. Miranda is 
on the one side and you turn it over and on the other side it 
asks if those are -- if they completely understand the Miranda 
that they have been given and if they wish to make a statement 
or talk to an attorney. 
o. Did he respond to that question? 
A. He responded to both. 
o. What did he say? 
A. He said he understood his rights and he really 
didn't have anything to say. 
MR. EBERT: Your Honor, I object and I reserve a 
mot ion. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
MR. EBERT: your Honor, I would ask to argue this 
-f,-
right now. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. EBERT: Your Honor, I would like to argue it 
the presence of the jury. 
THE COURT: You will have an opportunity to do that. 
You may proceed with your questioning. 
MR. GUNNARSON: Thank you. 
o. (By Mr. Gunnarson) Did he indicate he didn't 
want to talk to you? 
A. At that time he did, yes. 
o. What exactly did he say? 
A. Something to the effect that he didn't have 
anything to say. 
o. Did he say he had nothing to say or that he 
didn't want to talk to you? 
A. Just that he didn't have anything to say. 
o. What happened next? 
A. I left the scene and was transporting him down 
to the jail, 
o. okay. was there any conversation at that time? 
A. yes, sir. 
o. Who intiated the conversation? Who started it? 
A. He did. He made a statement to me when I first 
got back into the vehicle when 
j a i 1 • 
was taking him back to the 




o. What did he say? 
A. He sa irl, "I guess she saw me with the steren 
equipment, too?" 
The above dialCXJue is the only reference in the 
record that could even be construed as an improper comment by 
the prosecutor. There is no indication that the prosecutor in 
this situation purposefully placed the appellant's silence 
before the jury in an attempt to discredit the appellant. The 
prosecutor did not cross examine the appellant as to his 
reaction at the time he received the Miranda, nor did the 
prosecutor comment on appellant's silence in his closing 
argument. The testimony was soliciterl for the appropriate 
purpose of establishing a foundation for appellant's voluntary 
statement, "I guess she saw me with the stereo equipment too." 
Moreover, it was appellant's counsel who made repeated 
reference to appellant's silence at the time he received the 
Miranda rights (T. 116, 17R). 
While appellant claims that the testirrony had no 
relevance or probative value to the state's case, the 
prosecutor explained that the state need to properly lay a 
foundation for appellant's voluntary statement concerning his 
knowledge of the stereo equipment. When this identical issue 
was brought before the lower court, in presentation of 
arguments to the trial judge the prosecutor clearly outlined 
his motives for soliciting testimony from Officer Maack 
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concerning the events at the time the Miranda rights were 
given to the appellant: "Now, anticipating that [the statment 
concerning the stereo] was going to come out and there had to 
he a foundation laid for it, then the question of two parts 
came in under custody first, and foundation in court 
that the Miranda warnings had been given." (R. 428, 42'l). 
It needed to be established that the appellant had 
received and understood the Miranda rights and had not been 
coerced by law enforcement personnel to give a confession 
about his knowledge of the stereo equipment. There was no 
error in soliciting testimony concerning the events at the 
time of appellant's arrest when the purpose was to lay a 
foundation for later testi!T'Ony. 
Furthermore case law totally supports the use of 
such testimony for legitimate purposes. The situation in this 
case is virtually identical to that in State v. Urias, Utah, 
609 P.2d 1326 (l'lRO), where the Prosecutor questioned a police 
officer as follows: 
o. And as I recall, you testified concerning this 
statement as to the defendant's rights? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
* * * * * * * * 
o. After you read him the statement of his rights, 
did you ask if he understood them? 
A. Yes, Sir. 
o. And what was his answer? 
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A. He exerciserl his rl(Jhts rind t<' cnntact dn 
attorney before he made any statement. 
o. nid he thereafter discuss this matter with ynu 
at that time? 
A. No, Sir. T ca l 1 e ci h is at t n r n •' y. 
o. Alright-
THF CO!JRT: The last pa rt of the answer wil 1 he 
stricken. It is a volunteer statement by the witness. YOU 
asked him if he then discussed it with him and the answer is, 
no. Anything else is to be disregarded. Urias, at 1328. 
There the defendant claimed that his right to remain 
silent had been violated by the testimony. This Court replied 
as follows: 
we agree with the proposition that when a 
person invokes his constitutional rights, 
the prosecution should not comment 
thereon, nor so use it in any way that 
will tend to impair or destroy that 
privilege. But we do not perceive that 
this was done in this case. Except for 
what was said above, there was no further 
reference to the matter, either in 
testimony or in argument to the jury. It 
is apparent that the prosecutor was having 
the officer testify to the circumstances 
of the arrest and that the information 
elicited was but a part of the natural 
sequence of events. It is difficult to 
see how that could have been done, or how 
the case could have been presented without 
the jury becoming aware in some manner 
that the defendant had, in fact, exercised 
his right to remain silent. It is 
significant that there is no indication 
that the prosecutor made any attempt to 
use that fact to cast any inference of 
guilt of the defenrlant, nor to persuade 
the jury to do so. urias, at 1328. 
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The prosecutor in this case, as in !Irias, did not 
impair or destroy the appellant's constitutional right. He 
merely el ici terl information that was a part of the natural 
se0uence of events at the time of arrest. The prosecutor when 
cross-examining the appellant rlirl not refer to his silence at 
the time of arrest, nor did the prosecutor comment on 
appellant's silence in his closing argument. The prosecutor 
rlid not attempt to cast any inference of guilt upon the 
appellant, nor did he attempt to hias the jury. Based on 
Urias, there was no prejudicial error committed that requires 
a new trial . Likewise, when other jurisidictions have heen 
presented with this issue they have found no error. 
Arizona is one of a number of jurisdicitions which 
have considered the issue raised here, i.e., whether or not it 
is reversible error per se to make any reference to a 
defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent before the 
jury. In State v. Bowie, 119 Ariz. 336, 580 P.2d ll'lO (1'!78), 
a prosecutor had asked a police officer, "After you read Mr. 
Rowie his rights did Mr. Bowie make any statement to you?" 
The officer answered, "No" The Arizona Supreme Court stated: 
Generally, it is error for the prosecutor 
to draw a derogatory inference from the 
fact that the accused declined to speak to 
police upon his arrest. (Cites to Doyle 
v. Ohio 426 U.S. 610 (1'!76)) However, in 
the present case, the prosecutor never 
commented upon the accused's silence 
during custodial interrogation; the 
prosecutor merely questioned the officer 
about the events of the arrest and 
inquired whether the defendant said 
anything. 
-11-
The rationale of Doyle, supra, suggests 
that the state should not make any 
reference to the fact that the rlefenrlant 
exercised his right to remain silent after 
arrest. Consequently, it was improiwr for 
the prosecutor to ask the otficer if 
appellant made any hut we rlo 
not find the quest ion to he reversihle 
error for the following reasons: This one 
exchange between the prosecutor and 
officer was the only time appellant's 
post-arrest silence was mentioned; when 
appellant took the stand he was not 
cross-examined ahout his failure to give a 
statement to the police; the prosecutor 
said nothing about appellant's silent in 
his jury arguments. Under these 
circumstances, we find that the 
prosecutor's improper question dirl not 
prejudice appellant, and there was no 
reversible error. 
at 1195. 
In State v. Satterfield, 3 Kan. App. 2d 212, 592 
P. 2d 135 ( 1979), the Court noted: 
(T)he trial court erred when it 
allowed evidence to he introduced that 
dealt with defendant's election to remain 
silent in the absence of his attorney 
Nevertheless, a new trial is not 
required if the court finds from the 
totality of circumstances that such 
conduct constituted harmless error beyond 
a reasonable douht. 
592 P.2d at 142. 
The Court in State v. LeBrun, 37 Or.App. 411, 587 
P. 2d 1044 ( 19713), also stated: 
Assuming arguendo that the officer 
should not have been permitted to testify 
as to defendant's unwillingness to discuss 
the matter further, the important inquiry, 
of course, is the prejudice likely to flow 
from the officer's testimony. Given the 
-12-
overwhelming evidence of guilt, we are 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the result of the trial would not have 
been different wihout the challenged 
answer. 
587 P.2d at 1046. See also People v. Rooney, 16 Ill.App.3d 
9nl, 307 N.E.2d 216 at 219 (1974); United States v. Dixon, 593 
F.2d 62fi at 628-629 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Sklaroff, 552 F.2d 1156 at 1161-1162 (5th Cir. 1977); Moore v. 
Cowan, 560 F.2d 1298 at 1302 (6th Cir. 1977); and Taylor v. 
Dalsheim, 459 F.supp. 2fi0 at 263-264 (S.O.N.Y 1978). 
All of these cases bear remarkable similarity to the 
matter at hand, In each case the fact of the defendant's 
post-Miranda warning silence was introduced into testimony. 
In each case that fact was not used to cross-examine the 
defendant nor used during the prosecutor's closing arguments. 
Appellant cites a few cases that hold that reference 
to post-arrest silence warrants reversal, but these cases, 
Doyle v. Ohio, 4 26 u .s. 610 ( 1976 I, and State v. Wiswell, 
Utah, fi39 P.2d 146 ( 1981 I are readily distinguishable. In 
both cases, the prosecutor, during cross-examination, 
repeatedly referred to the defandants' post-arrest silence. 
In addition the prosecutors argued the defendants' post-arrest 
silence to the juries in their closing arguments. Since Doyle 
and Wiswell govern in instances where the prosecutor makes 
continued attempts to put the defendant's silence before the 
Jury, they do not apply to this situation where the prosecutor 
did not make any attempt to place the appellant's silence 
hefore the Jury. 
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Furthermore, the fact that appellant chnse tn give 
his voluntary statement in the police car, mintues after 
receiving the Miranda rights infers that he never chose to 
remain silent. His first statement that hP did not have 
anything to say at that time could he interpretted to mean, "I 
don't have anything to say right now but I will tell you 
something in a few mintues," If such was the case the 
appellant's right to remain silent was never invoked. 
Despite appellant's claim, there was no intent on 
the part of the prosecutor to interpret appellant's silence as 
an inference of guilt. Had the prosecutor intended to do so 
he would likely have used the silence while cross-examining 
appellant or certainly during his closing remarks, 
Nevertheless, during both of these crucial periods the state 
made no mention whatsoever of appellant's exercise of his 
Fifth Amendment freedoms. As the offending remarks are read 
in context, it is clear that the prosecutor was merely 
inquiring into the circumstances of the arrest and attempting 
to make the officer's testimony clear and coherent. The 
prosecutor was laying an appropriate foundation for 
appellant's statement concerning the stereo equipment. 
However, should this Court find that the manner of 
questioning did improperly comment on Appellant's post arrest 
silence, the error was harmless in the context of this record 
and is not sufficient to merit a reversal. 
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The evidence of appellant's guilt apart from any 
inferences created by the fact of appellant's silence after 
receipt of the Miranda rights was overwhelming. Ms. Bailey 
identified the appellant as the man she had watched walk from 
heh ind the bush, right in front of her car and the down the 
street (T. 44). A stereo, missing from the home next door to 
Mr, Bailey's was discovered in the bush where the appellant 
was first seen (T. 90). Entry had been made into Mr. 
Goldstein's home hy breaking the glass on the front door, and 
the Appellant had fresh cuts on his hands with three different 
explanations as to how he got the cuts (T, 90, 120, 173, 193). 
Then after receiving the Miranda rights, the appellant asked 
Officer Maack if Ms. Bailey had seen him with the stereo (T. 
100). 
What this Court said in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 
1338 (Utah 1977), most certainly has application in this case: 
This court does not interfere with a 
jury verdict because of error of 
irregularity unless upon review of the 
entire record it is determined that 
prejudice has occurred in a substantial 
manner, i.e. the error must be such that 
there exists a reasonable probability or 
likelihood that there would have been a 
result more favorable to the defendant in 
absence of the error. 
572 P.2d at 1352. 
rn conclusion, while it is well established that 
although admission of the fact of a criminal defendant's 
post-arrest silence is error, such error does not require 
-15-
reversal in every case. The harmless err,,r rule> shr>u J ,1 t>e 
applied and reversal is only mandated when there is a 
possibility that the jury verrl ict would hcive t>een different 
without the offending testimony. In this matter there was 
overwhelming evidence of arpellant 's c1u1 Jt. Any possible 
inference created by the mention of appellant's silence could 
not reasonably have made a difference in the finding of guilt. 
Consequently, the verdict and sentence of the lower court must 
be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
Appellant contends that the evidence presented by 
the state was insufficient to support a guilty verdict of 
theft heyonc1 a reasonable doubt. 
Appellant was charged with Theft a Third Degree 
Felony, under Utah Code 7fi-fi-404, 412 (Supp. l'l7R). It 
was established during the trial that a theft occured when 
someone obtained unauthorized control over Mr. Goldstein's 
stereo by breaking into his home and removing the stereo 
without his permission, and that the person intended to 
deprive Mr. Goldstein of the stereo's use when he hid the 
stereo in the bush. The issue at trial was deciding whether 
the appellant was the person who had committed the act of 
theft. 
The state presented sufficient evidence linking the 
appellant with the crime. First, the state presented a 
witness who acutally saw the appellant come from the location 
where the stereo was found. Second, the state showed that 
entry had bPen made into Mr. Goldstein's home by breaking the 
door glass and that at the time the appellant was picked up he 
had fresh cuts on his hands, Finally, the appellant's own 
statement, "I suppose she saw me with the stereo equipment, 
too" further incriminated him. 
Ms. Bailey, the eye witness, a young woman, age 26 
testified that she saw the appellant step from around a bush 
and walk in front of her car, forcing her to stop (T. 37, 73) 
At that close range, with the car headlights shining on 
appellant, she was able to watch him for fifteen to twenty 
seconds (T. 3R). After finding a stereo in the bush where Ms. 
Bailey first noticed the appellant, she called the police (T. 
41). police officers found the appellant just blocks away 
from Ms. Bailey's home and took him to her home for a show-up 
( T. q3). Ms. Railey identified appellant as the man she had 
seen a few hours earlier (T. 44). The short time period 
between Ms. Bailey's initial sighting of appellant when he 
walked in front of her car and the subsequent identification 
at the show up greatly enhanced the likelihood of a correct 
identification. Moreover, Ms. Bailey was consistent in her 
identification of appellant at the show up, preliminary 
hearing and the trial (T. 44, 69, 51). Ms. Bailey's 
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eyewitness account suhstant li'll P\'Jdence that 
appellant was the perpetrator of the theft. J t can he 
inferred that when Ms. Railey first saw thP appPllant he was 
hiding the stereo in the hush after carryinij it away from Mr. 
Goldstein's home. 
Next, it was estahlished that entry had been made 
into Mr. Goldstein's home by breaking the front door glass and 
that appellant had fresh cuts on his hands at the time he was 
picked up (T. 'lO, lr11). Then contradictory stories were given 
by the appellant explaining the fresh cuts on his hands (T. 
1 20 ' 1 7 3 , 1 9 2 ) • This evidence estahlished appellant's guilt 
by showing that the appellant did not have the authority to 
enter Mr. Goldstein's home and remove his stereo since he had 
to break in to the home. 
Finally, appellant's voluntary admission of 
knowledge concerning the stereo equipment further established 
appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Appellant next argues that the state did not present 
evidence that appellant was the individual who actually stole 
the property. However, the circumstantial evidence as 
presented by the state was certainly sufficient to establish a 
conviction, "In Utah, as elsewhere, circumstanial evidence 
alone may be competent to establish the guilt of the accused." 
State v. Clayton, Utah, fi4fi P.2d 723, 725 (l'lR2l. Moreover 
the state is aided by the statutory J:'resumtion, lltah Code Ann. 
<;; 76-6-402(1) (1978) that: "Possession of property recently 
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stolen, when no satisfactory explanation of such possession is 
made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in 
possession stole the property." 
Finally, appellant argues that the jury's acquittal 
of appellant on the burglary charge indicated that the jury 
was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of appellant's 
guilt. such a contention is sheer speculation by appellant. 
The jury did find appellant guilty of theft. What the jury 
chose to do with the burglary charge is of no consequence to 
this appeal that deals with the theft conviction. 
When reviewing insufficiency of the evidence charges 
this Court follows the standard set out in State v. Mccardell, 
Utah, f)52 P.2d 942 (l'l82). 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in 
the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, and will only interfere when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that a reasonable man could not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Mccardell, at 945, see also State v. Petree, Utah, fi59 P.2d 
443, 444 ( 1983). 
In summary, the evidence presented at trial was 
sufficient to sustain the verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, appellant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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The State was merely laying a foundation for 
appellant's statement concerning thP steorP<' eq11i 1Hnent when it 
solicited testimony concerning the circumstances at the time 
of arrest. The error, if any, was harmless. Further, the 
evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support 
appellant's guilt of Theft beyond a reasonahle douht. 
For these reasons, the State respectfully submits 
that appellant's convict ion be affirmed. 
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